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Abstract
This paper provides an analytical characterization of the effects of noisy news shocks on fiscal
policy. We consider a small-scale Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with
capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply and show that noise dampens the propa-
gation of anticipated fiscal policy over the business cycle, thus reducing the fiscal multiplier.
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1 Introduction
A recent stream of literature has emphasized the role of news shocks in fiscal policy (see e.g.
Leeper et al. 2013): quantitatively, news shocks are the main driver of government spending
(Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2012, Khan and Tsoukalas 2012, Born et al. 2013). However, Fe`ve
and Pietrunti (2016) show that noisy news in government spending (in a medium–scale DSGE
model with real frictions) may lead to a reduction in the size of fiscal multipliers. The aim of this
note is to analytically clarify such effects. We therefore make use of a relevant small–scale DSGE
model with physical capital and endogenous labor supply featuring both a backward dimension
(through capital accumulation) and a forward one (expectations about the future policy). We
solve it analytically and show that noise on fiscal policy may persistently affect the economy due
to the reaction of private investment. Dupaigne and Fe`ve (2016) and Fe`ve and Pietrunti (2016)
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obtain that the response of investment is critical for government spending multiplier. We there-
fore concentrate our current analysis on capital accumulation.1 The paper is organized as follows.
A first section presents the DSGE model and the information structure. In a second section, we
expound the analytical results and discuss the effect of noisy news on investment. A last section
briefly concludes.
2 A Small-Scale DSGEModel with a Noisy Fiscal Policy
Throughout the paper we will work with the simplest and tractable possible model that is able
to deliver meaningful analytical results. Hence we consider a business cycle model with capital
accumulation, labor supply and exogenous government spending. The inter-temporal expected
utility function of the representative household is given by
Eˆt
∞∑
i=0
βt+i {log(ct+i)− ηnt+i}
where η > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor. Eˆt is the expectation operator conditional
on the information set available as of time t. The variables ct and nt represent the real consump-
tion and the household’s labor supply.2 The representative firm uses capital kt and labor input nt
to produce a homogeneous final good yt. Technology is represented by the following production
function yt = Akθt n
1−θ
t , where A > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1). The capital stock kt evolves according to
kt+1 = xt, where xt denotes investment. The physical capital fully depreciates every period.3
Finally, the final good can be either consumed, invested or devoted to government spending
yt = ct + xt + gt. We consider that the log of gt (in deviation from its non-stochastic steady-state)
follows an autoregressive process of order one
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt−1, (1)
where |ρ| ≤ 1 and εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
. The timing of shock is such that the government policy is
declared one period in advance, for ease of illustration. The expected government policy in period
t + 1 is given by Eˆtĝt+1 = ρĝt + Eˆtεt. In a perfect information setting the change in government
spending is perfectly anticipated by private agents. Hence this equation reduces to Eˆtĝt+1 =
ρĝt + εt ≡ ĝt+1. Here, we make the setting more general, assuming that private agents observe a
noisy signal of εt (i.e. a noisy news on government spending), given by
st = εt + νt (2)
where νt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ν
)
represents a noise shock and it is therefore uncorrelated with εt for any time
index. If σν → 0 we go back to the standard full information case. If σν > 0, information is noisy
1The positive responses of output follow the ones of investment. Check figure 2 in Appendix B for the dynamic
responses of output.
2The linearity assumption in leisure’s utility greatly simplifies the computation of the solution because the real
wage and the real interest rate depend only on real consumption (see Dupaigne and Fe`ve 2016).
3Our results can be easily extended to incomplete depreciation (See Kass-Hanna 2016).
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as private agents do not perfectly observe new policy announcements. Noise here is a shortcut for
capturing both the complex political process that leads to fiscal policy changes4 and the complex
task of gathering information on newly announced policies. In this case of imperfect information,
it can be shown that the conditional expectations of private agents are a linear function of the
signal received: Eˆtεt = αst ≡ α (εt + νt), where the parameter α is obtained by a linear projection
of εt on st (see Hamilton 1994)
α =
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
ν
.
When information is perfectly observed (σν = 0 and α = 1), private agents fully incorporate
the announced government policy in their consumption/saving and labor supply choices. Con-
versely, when information about the announced economic policy is totally noisy (σε/σν → 0 and
α→ 0), they will not react to the announced economic policy.
3 The Dynamic Responses to Noisy News
To get more insights about the effects of the noisy expected government spending, we derive
the log–linearized version of equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady state. In
Appendix A, we report the solutions for output, consumption and investment. Here, we focus
on the response of investment (or next period capital) to noisy fiscal shocks.5 The solution for
investment is given by:
x̂t = θx̂t−1 + sg
(
ρ− θ
1− βθρ
)
ĝt + αsg
(
1− βθ2
1− βθρ
)
st, (3)
where sg denotes the share of government spending in output at steady state. From equation (3),
we can characterize the dynamic responses to both news and noise.
Proposition 1 The dynamic responses of investment to noise (νt) and news (εt) are given by:
∂xˆt+h
∂νt
= αθhsg
1− βθ2
1− βθρ (4)
∂xˆt+h
∂εt
=
∂xˆt+h
∂νt
+
sg
1− βθρ(ρ
h − θh) (5)
for h ≥ 0.
Proof: See Kass-Hanna (2016).
Proposition 1 shows that the responses of investment to noise and news are heavily linked. In
particular, equation (5) shows that the response to news has two components: the first depends
4For example, it may represent the imperfect credibility and/or transparency of the government policy (See Fe`ve
and Pietrunti 2016 for a discussion).
5See Kass-Hanna (2016) for a complete characterization of output, consumption and investment dynamic responses.
As illustration, see figure 2 for the dynamic response of output in Appendix B.
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on α and corresponds to the investment response to noise; the second component is independent
of α and is equivalent to the investment response to an unexpected shock that arrives one period
ahead.6 In more intuitive terms, the response to an anticipated government spending shock εt
is twofold: a direct response to the signaling of the news that persists after the realization of
the shock (h ≥ 1), and a response to the material realization of the expected shock at h = 1,
respectively. Notice that the second term of equation (5) is equal to 0 for h = 0. The presence of
noise reduces the impact response of investment to expected policy by diminishing the first term
of equation (5) (since α < 1), hence weakening the impact response of investment to the signaling
of the news, as noise makes news less credible.
We now turn to three specific cases to further illustrate the effect and propagation of noisy
fiscal policy over time.
First, we consider the peculiar case where investment does not react to contemporaneous
fiscal policy (ie. ρ = θ).7 Under such assumption, its dynamics simplify to
x̂t = θx̂t−1 + αsgst.
Investment responds only to the signaling of the fiscal policy and can thus be equally explained
by news and noise shocks when σε = σν (ie. α = 1/2). From the above equation we obtain that
the information friction (initially) created by noisy news (α < 1) will persist along the transition
path toward the non–stochastic steady-state. Indeed, the dynamic responses of investment are
such that
∂x̂t+h
∂εt
≡ ∂x̂t+h
∂νt
= αθhsg
for h ≥ 0. It follows immediately that the relative difference between the full and partial infor-
mation settings is given by the size of the initial information friction 1− α, and is invariant to the
horizon. This result ensues because information friction changes the impact responses without
modifying the model’s dynamic properties.
Second, consider the case where ρ 6= θ, and public policy is very noisy (α → 0). In this case,
the dynamics of investment are governed by
x̂t = θx̂t−1 + sg
(
ρ− θ
1− βθρ
)
ĝt,
which is equivalent to the case of an unexpected shock (see Dupaigne and Fe`ve 2016) but one step
ahead. Indeed, because public policy is (almost) perfectly noisy, private agents do not react to
6Notice that the response of investment to an unexpected shock that arrives at t + 1 would be equivalent to
∂xˆt+h
∂gˆt+1
=
sg
1−βθρ (ρ
h − θh).
7Given standard calibrations for θ around 0.4 and ρ larger than 0.9, this assumption seems hard to swallow. Note
however that in general, the parameter of interest is not θ per se, but rather µ = θ
θ+(1−θ)(1−β(1−δ)) (the stable root of the
model), which happens to be equal to θ in our complete depreciation case (δ = 1). Under an incomplete depreciation
scenario whereby δ = 0.015, β = 0.98, and θ = 0.4, the parameter of interest µ equals 0.95, a value close to the standard
calibration for ρ, rendering our first considered case more relevant, especially under incomplete depreciation. Indeed,
the estimates of the first-order autoregressive coefficient of US government spending are found to be large (0.97 in
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Leeper et al. (2010)).
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signals. It follows that this extreme case of noisy fiscal policy deeply impacts the short-run effect
of news shocks on government spending, because it introduces a systematic delay in the diffusion
of the policy to the private sector. With time, the effect of this delay progressively disappears.
Third, we consider a more realistic case of a highly persistent process for government spend-
ing (ρ→ 1) such that ρ 6= θ. Accordingly, the dynamics of investment are governed by
∆x̂t = θ∆x̂t−1 + sg
(
1− θ
1− βθ
)
εt−1 + αsg
(
1− βθ2
1− βθ
)
∆st,
where ∆ is the first difference operator. Notice that during the implementation phase of govern-
ment spending (i.e. q = 1) news and noise shocks equally explain the variance of investment.
However, when the news shock realizes, expected government policy begins to matter while the
contribution of noise gradually fades out. Nevertheless, the impact of noise is not extinguished
at the realization of the shock, it rather propagates over time. As in the cases discussed above, the
response on impact is directly linked to the value of α:
∂x̂t
∂εt
= αsg
1− βθ2
1− βθ .
The relative difference on impact between the full and partial information cases depends only on
α. Nonetheless, the difference persists even after the news shock realizes. Indeed, the response to
news at t+ 1 is given by
∂x̂t+1
∂εt
= sg(1− θ)1− α(1− βθ
2)
1− βθ ,
whereby the relative difference between full and partial information equals (1− α(1− βθ2)/(βθ2).
Notice that the difference after the realization of the shock does not only depend on α, but also
on the interaction of imperfect information with deep parameters representing preferences and
technology.
The argument made so far can be extended to the case in which fiscal shocks are generically
declared q > 1 periods in advance. In this case, the government spending process rewrites
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt−q. (6)
In Figure 1 we plot the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of investment to news shocks under
alternative scenarios. In the left panel we plot the IRF of investment when q = 1 for three different
values of α, ranging from the perfect information case (α = 1) to the extremely noisy one (α→ 0).
Note that for α > 0 agents start accumulating new capital stock since the announcement of the
policy, at a pace that reflects the quality of the information received. However, when information
is completely noisy, the capital stock stands still until the news realizes. Such a shock comes in-
deed unexpected for the agents populating this economy. In the right panel, we plot the response
when news is announced four periods in advance (q = 4). Notice that a gradual accumulation
of capital – increasing with α – occurs directly after the announcement of the policy and before
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the realization of the shock. We also plot (in red dashed line) the response to noise under the
assumption of an equal share of news and noise in the economy (σε = σν , hence α = 0.5). We
observe that up to the realization of the shock in period q, the reaction to both shocks is exactly
the same. Also notice that the effect of noisy fiscal policy persists due to the backward–looking
behavior of capital accumulation (See also the Figure 2 in Appendix B).
Figure 1: IRFs of investment to news and noise shocks
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Note: Parameters are set at the following values: β = 0.98, θ = 0.4 and ρ = 0.95.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown in a small–scale DSGE model that news shocks on fiscal policy
mainly propagate through capital accumulation. Such dynamics are hampered when imperfect
information is introduced to the setting and the effect of noise in the reaction of investment is
long lasting, as it persists even after a news shock materializes.
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Appendix
A The Equilibrium with Noisy Fiscal Policy
The dynamic equilibrium of this economy is summarized by the following equations
kt+1 = yt − ct − gt (A.1)
yt = k
θ
t n
1−θ
t (A.2)
η =
1
ct
(1− θ) yt
nt
(A.3)
1
ct
= βθEˆt
[(
yt+1
kt+1
)
1
ct+1
]
(A.4)
Equation (A.1) defines the law of motion of physical capital with complete depreciation, while
equations (A.2) and (A.3) are the production function and the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure at equilibrium. The last equation (A.4) represents the Euler equa-
tion on consumption. The log–linearization of (A.1)-(A.4) around the non-stochastic steady state
yields
k̂t+1 =
y
k
ŷt − sc y
k
ĉt − sg y
k
ĝt (A.5)
ŷt = θk̂t + (1− θ)n̂t (A.6)
n̂t = ŷt − ĉt (A.7)
Eˆtĉt+1 = ĉt + Eˆt(ŷt+1 − k̂t+1) (A.8)
where y/k = 1/(βθ), sc = c/y ≡ 1 − βθ − sg and sg = g/y. After substitution of (A.7) into (A.6),
one gets
ŷt − k̂t = −1− θ
θ
ĉt
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Now, using the above expression, (A.5) and (A.8) rewrite
Eˆtĉt+1 = µĉt with µ = θ ∈ (0, 1) (A.9)
k̂t+1 = ν1k̂t − ν2ĉt − ν3ĝt , (A.10)
with
ν1 =
1
βµ
> 1 , ν2 = (y/k)(((1− θ)/θ) + sc) > 0 and ν3 = sg(y/k) > 0,
As µ < 1 and µν1 = 1/β > 1, we immediately deduce ν1 > 1. Then, equation (A.10) must be
solved forward
k̂t =
(
ν2
ν1
)
lim
T→∞
Eˆt
T∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĉt+i +
(
ν3
ν1
)
lim
T→∞
Eˆt
T∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĝt+i + lim
T→∞
Eˆt
(
1
ν1
)T
k̂t+T .
Excluding explosive pathes, i.e. limT→∞ Eˆt (1/ν1)T k̂t+T = 0 and taking the limit, we have:
k̂t =
(
ν2
ν1
)
Eˆt
∞∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĉt+i +
(
ν3
ν1
)
Eˆt
∞∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĝt+i.
Now, using (1), (2) and (A.9), one gets(
ν2
ν1
)
Eˆt
∞∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĉt+i =
ν2
ν1 − µĉt(
ν3
ν1
)
Eˆt
∞∑
i=0
(
1
ν1
)i
ĝt+i =
ν3
ν1 − ρĝt + α
ν3
ν1(ν1 − ρ)st,
from which we deduce the decision rule on consumption:
ĉt =
(
ν1 − µ
ν2
)
k̂t −
(
ν3(ν1 − µ)
ν2(ν1 − ρ)
)
ĝt − α
(
ν3(ν1 − µ)
ν1ν2(ν1 − ρ)
)
st. (A.11)
After substituting (A.11) into (A.10), the dynamics of capital is given by:
k̂t+1 = µk̂t +
(
ν3(ρ− µ)
ν1 − ρ
)
ĝt + α
(
ν3(ν1 − µ)
ν1(ν1 − ρ)
)
st. (A.12)
The persistence properties of the model are thus governed by the parameter µ ∈ (0, 1) and the
response of the physical capital to the announced government spending policy critically depends
on α and ρ. Now, using the expressions for µ, ν1, ν2 and ν3, and the dynamics of capital (or
equivalently investment, as with full depreciation we have x̂t = k̂t+1) (A.12), the consumption
function (A.11) and the production function
ŷt = k̂t − 1− θ
θ
ĉt,
we can characterize the dynamics of this economy in response to noisy news on government
spending (See Kass-Hanna (2016) for a complete characterization of the dynamic responses of
each variable).
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B The Dynamic Responses of Output
Figure 2: IRFs of output to news and noise shocks
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Note: Parameters are set at the following values: β = 0.98, θ = 0.4 and ρ = 0.95.
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